Gallo v. City of Philadelphia by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-23-1998 
Gallo v. City of Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Gallo v. City of Philadelphia" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 267. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/267 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed November 23, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 98-1071 and 98-1238 
 
JAMES J. GALLO, JR.; 
ROSE MARIA GALLO, 
 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; RENALD PELSZYNSKI, LT., 
individually and in his official capacity; JOSEPH RIZZO, 
individually; MITCHELL S. GOLDBERG, individually; 
GERALD J. KUFTA, individually; KUFTA ASSOCIATES; 
COZEN & O'CONNOR; PENNSYLVANIA LUMBERMEN'S 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; *THOMAS J. ROONEY, 
in his individual capacity; WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, in his 
individual capacity 
 
       *Amended per Clerk's 4/7/98 order  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-03909) 
 
Argued October 8, 1998 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, NYGAARD, and NOONAN,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 23, 1998) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr., Senior Judge of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
       David Rudovsky (argued) 
       Kairys, Rudovsky, Epstein, 
        Messing & Rau 
       924 Cherry St., Suite 500 
       Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 
       Franklin E. Fink 
       David Lockard & Assoc. P.C. 
       1101 Market St., Suite 2832 
       Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
       City of Philadelphia 
       Law Department 
       Stephanie L. Franklin-Suber 
       City Solicitor 
       Marcia Berman (argued) 
       Assistant City Solicitor, 
       Appeals Unit 
       One Parkway Building 
       1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
        Lt. Renald Pelszynski and 
        City of Philadelphia 
 
       Michael R. Stiles 
       United States Attorney 
       Joan K. Garner (argued) 
       Deputy Chief, Civil Division 
       Assistant United States Attorney 
       615 Chestnut Street 
       Suite 1250 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106-4476 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
        Thomas J. Rooney and 
        William J. Campbell 
 
                                2 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
After a jury acquitted him of charges that he deliberately 
had set fire to his business in Philadelphia, James Gallo 
brought suit under 28 U.S.C. S 1983 and Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), against the City of 
Philadelphia and the municipal and federal officials 
responsible for investigating his case.1  Gallo claimed that 
the municipal fire marshal had altered his views on the 
fire's cause in response to pressure from representatives of 
Gallo's insurance company, and that all of the officials had 
withheld exculpatory evidence from the United States 
Attorney. The district court, construing Gallo's suit as a 
claim of malicious prosecution, concluded that the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 
U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), required Gallo to show 
that he had suffered a Fourth Amendment seizure. The 
court ruled that the pretrial restrictions imposed upon 
Gallo, which included posting a bond and limiting inter- 
state travel, did not amount to a seizure. It therefore 
granted the City and municipal defendants' summary 
judgment motion and the federal officials' motion to 
dismiss. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F. Supp. 723 
(E.D. Pa. 1997). Because we conclude that the intentional 
restrictions imposed on Gallo's liberty qualified as a 
seizure, we will reverse. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291; the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343(a) and 1367. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In the district court, Gallo's case involved additional defendants and 
claims. We, however, only need discuss the section 1983 and Bivens 
claims against the appellees as the other defendants and claims have 
been dismissed. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History 
 
Inasmuch as the district court resolved this case by 
granting a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary 
judgment, we consider the facts in the light most favorable 
to Gallo. See Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 
F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir.), cert. granted and denied, 119 S.Ct. 
31, 170 (1998); Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 577 (3d 
Cir. 1996). On June 11, 1989, a fire extensively damaged 
Gallo's Cabinets, a shop in Philadelphia owned by 
appellant, James Gallo. Lt. Renald Pelszynski, a 
Philadelphia fire marshal dispatched to the scene to 
establish the fire's cause, concluded that thefire started 
when a hand iron ignited a cloth. Pelszynski recorded his 
conclusion about the fire's origin in a Fire Marshal's 
Incident Report. Gallo claims that nothing in this report 
suggested that the fire resulted from arson. 
 
After the fire, Gallo filed a claim with Pennsylvania 
Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company, which indirectly 
employed two persons to investigate the fire's cause, Gerald 
Kufta and Joseph Rizzo. Kufta is an investigator and Rizzo 
is a former Philadelphia Fire Commissioner. Kufta and 
Rizzo contacted Lt. Pelszynski to discuss the fire's 
circumstances without complying with Fire Department 
procedures that required them to apply in writing to speak 
to Pelszynski. The record does not include any 
documentation of the substance of their conversations. 
 
Gallo claims that after Pelszynski spoke to Kufta and 
Rizzo, he changed his Fire Marshal's Incident Report in two 
primary ways. First, he altered the cause of fire entry from 
electrical appliance to incendiary, thus suggesting arson. 
Second, he added text to the report stating his view that 
someone deliberately had wrapped a cloth around the 
heating iron to start the fire. Gallo claims that Pelszynski 
never disclosed the existence of the "original" report, and 
that, in fact, he took steps to conceal it. 
 
After filing the allegedly revised report, Pelszynski 
referred Gallo's case to the joint Philadelphia-Federal arson 
task force. The United States Attorney's Office opened a 
criminal investigation in July 1990, and Thomas Rooney 
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and William Campbell, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco & Firearms, were assigned to the case. 
Subsequently, Rooney prepared a report in which he stated 
that the Fire Marshal's office had ruled that the origin of 
the fire was incendiary and in which he made no mention 
of Pelszynski's original report. 
 
On May 31, 1994, a federal grand jury indicted Gallo on 
two counts of mail fraud, one count of malicious 
destruction of a building by fire, and one count of making 
false statements to obtain a loan. After responding to a 
notice, Gallo was arraigned on the charges on August 4, 
1994, and was released on a $10,000 personal 
recognizance bond. He never was arrested, detained, or 
handcuffed. As a condition of his release, the court 
prohibited Gallo from traveling beyond New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania and instructed him to contact Pretrial 
Services weekly. These restrictions remained in effect 
through Gallo's trial in March 1995, a period of over eight 
months from when the court imposed them. 
 
After the indictment, Gallo requested the United States 
Attorney's Office to produce all exculpatory material, but 
the government initially did not provide him with a copy of 
the original fire marshal report. Moreover, neither Kufta, 
Rizzo, nor Pelszynski produced this report in response to 
Gallo's subpoenas seeking all materials in their possession 
that related to the Gallo fire. 
 
On January 6, 1995, approximately two months before 
his trial, Gallo learned of the existence of Pelszynski's 
original report when the United States Attorney's office 
supplied it to him. The government claimed that the report 
came from Rooney's files but that Rooney was unsure of its 
origin. 
 
Although Gallo pled guilty to the count of making a false 
statement to obtain a loan, he went to trial on the other 
counts of the indictment. During the trial, Gallo used 
Pelszynski's original report to cross-examine him, but 
Pelszynski claimed that he knew nothing about the report 
and had concluded from the beginning of his investigation 
that the fire at Gallo's Cabinets had been set intentionally. 
The jury acquitted Gallo of all remaining charges in the 
indictment. 
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B. Procedural History 
 
Following his acquittal, Gallo filed two separate suits 
alleging violations of his federal rights. In thefirst suit 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, he claimed that the City of 
Philadelphia, Pelszynski, Kufta and Rizzo, among others, 
had caused the federal government to prosecute him 
without probable cause. In the second suit, a Bivens action, 
Gallo contended that Rooney and Campbell had deprived 
him of his constitutional rights by failing to disclose the 
existence of the "original" report until two months prior to 
trial. The district court consolidated the cases. 
 
Subsequently, the City of Philadelphia and Lt. Pelszynski 
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing in part that 
Gallo had suffered no constitutional injury justifying a 
section 1983 action because he had not been "seized" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Rooney and 
Campbell filed a motion to dismiss contending that they 
had qualified immunity and that, in any case, failure to 
turn over exculpatory material in a more timely manner 
was not a constitutional injury. 
 
The district court granted both of these motions for the 
same reason in the same opinion and order. Construing 
Gallo's complaint as alleging a claim of malicious  
prosecution,2 the court found that the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. 
Ct. 807, required Gallo to show a Fourth Amendment 
violation in order to prove a constitutional injury. The court 
then ruled that Gallo had failed to show such a violation 
because the restrictions on his liberty pending and during 
trial did not amount to a seizure. Thus, the court found 
that he could not recover under either section 1983 or in a 
Bivens action. The district court specifically did not rule on 
whether Gallo had satisfied the common law elements of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Decisions have "recognized that a S 1983 malicious prosecution claim 
might be maintained against one who furnished false information to, or 
concealed material information from, prosecuting authorities." 1A Martin 
A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation, S3.20, at 316 (3d 
ed. 1997). 
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malicious prosecution claim or whether the federal agents 
were entitled to qualified immunity. Gallo then appealed.3 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Did the Restrictions Imposed upon Gallo as Part of His 
       Criminal Prosecution Amount to a Seizure under the 
       Fourth Amendment? 
 
The federal and municipal officials raise various 
challenges in their brief to Gallo's claims in this appeal.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Rooney and Campbell argue that we do not have jurisdiction to review 
the district court's grant of their motion to dismiss because Gallo failed 
to mention specifically the motion in his notice of appeal. After 
considering this argument, we conclude that the notice sufficiently 
informed them of Gallo's intent to appeal the order granting the motion. 
Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the district court's decision to 
dismiss Gallo's suit against them. 
 
4. The appellees did not raise many of the arguments in the district court 
that they advance on appeal, although Rooney and Campbell did claim 
qualified immunity. As we have indicated "[t]his court has consistently 
held that it will not consider issues that are raised for the first time 
on 
appeal." Harris v. Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, 
we decline to address the appellees' arguments on issues other than 
whether the restrictions imposed upon Gallo amounted to a seizure and 
whether Rooney and Campbell have qualified immunity; the remaining 
arguments may be addressed by the district court on remand. 
 
We will not affirm the dismissal as to Rooney and Campbell based on 
their qualified immunity claims. Under the qualified immunity doctrine, 
a government official will be liable only if the plaintiff can show that 
the 
official violated clearly established law of which a reasonable person 
should have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 
S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). The relevant question is"whether that law was 
clearly established at the time an action occurred." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 
818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Rooney and Campbell suggest that the official 
"action" Gallo protests is his post-indictment seizure, which began in 
August 1994. In our view, however, the allegedly unlawful actions 
occurred earlier, when Rooney and Campbell failed to provide 
exculpatory material to the prosecutor. If, as the record suggests, all of 
these actions occurred prior to 1994, then Rooney and Campbell are not 
entitled to qualified immunity because the pre-Albright law of this 
circuit 
clearly provided that malicious prosecution violated federal law. See Lee 
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But the district court granted the motion to dismiss and 
the motion for summary judgment on a single issue: it 
concluded that Gallo had failed to show a constitutional 
violation, as required by section 1983 and Bivens, because 
the restrictions imposed on him did not qualify as a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Our review 
of a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss or 
a motion for summary judgment is plenary. See Smith, 139 
F.3d at 183; Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 143 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 
1. The effect of Albright v. Oliver on malicio us prosecution 
       claims in federal court 
 
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Albright , we 
permitted plaintiffs to bring malicious prosecution claims 
under section 1983 by merely alleging the common law 
elements of the tort. See Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69- 
70 (3d Cir. 1988). Our cases held that by proving a 
violation of the common law tort, a plaintiff proved a 
violation of substantive due process that could form the 
basis for a section 1983 suit. See, e.g., Lippay v. Christos, 
996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that "the elements of 
liability for the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution under S 
1983 
coincide with those of the common law tort"); see also United States v. 
Lanier, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1226 (1997) (suggesting that decisions of the 
Courts of Appeals are sufficient to make a right"clearly established"); 
Pro 
v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1996) (assuming that 
decisions of this court can clearly establish a right for qualified 
immunity purposes); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 
1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992) ("in order for the law to be clearly 
established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on 
point"). 
 
We are not to be understood that the withholding of exculpatory 
information always will deprive a public official of qualified immunity. 
After all, some information may be tangential or the prosecutor may 
obtain it from another source. Here, however, the information in the 
original report goes to the essence of the arson charges. Finally, we note 
that our decision on the qualified immunity issue is without prejudice to 
any of the individual appellees seeking qualified immunity on remand. 
Perhaps the factual predicate for the defense may change. 
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Albright, however, casts doubt on the holding of cases 
like Lee by suggesting that a plaintiff bringing a malicious 
prosecution claim must allege a claim based on explicit 
constitutional text, "not the more generalized notion of 
substantive due process." 510 U.S. at 273, 114 S. Ct. at 
813 (citations omitted). Although we addressed a post- 
Albright malicious prosecution claim in Hilfirty v. Shipman, 
91 F.3d 573, the only relevant issue before us in that case 
was whether a grant of nolle prosequi satisfied the common 
law requirement that the prosecution end in the plaintiff's 
favor. See id. at 579. Similarly, in Montgomery v. DeSimone, 
No. 97-5179 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 1998), we addressed only the 
absence of probable cause element of malicious prosecution 
claims. Thus, this case is our first occasion to consider 
Albright's holding that section 1983 malicious prosecution 
claims must show more than a substantive due process 
violation. 
 
Albright involved a baseless drug charge. See 510 U.S. at 
268, 114 S.Ct. 810. After learning that a warrant had 
issued for his arrest, Albright surrendered to the 
authorities and was released after posting a bond. See id. 
An Illinois court later dismissed the charges against him for 
failing to state an offense under Illinois law. See Albright, 
510 U.S. at 269, 114 S. Ct. at 810. Albright then sued the 
police officer who had obtained the arrest warrant under 
section 1983, alleging that the officer had deprived him of 
his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from 
prosecution except upon probable cause. See id. The Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the suit on the 
ground that Albright had failed to show incarceration, loss 
of employment, or some other "palpable consequence" 
caused by the prosecution. Albright, 510 U.S. 269-70, 114 
S. Ct. at 811 (citations omitted). 
 
Writing for a four-member plurality, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist affirmed the dismissal and held "that 
substantive due process, with its `scarce and open-ended' 
`guideposts' [could] afford [Albright] no relief." Albright, 510 
U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. at 814 (citations omitted). In 
reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquistfirst 
noted that Albright claimed neither that he was denied 
procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
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Amendment nor that he suffered a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights. Rather, Albright's claim was limited to 
the narrow issue of his substantive due process right to be 
free from a prosecution without probable cause. See 
Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S. Ct. at 812. Upholding the 
district court's dismissal, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
announced "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an 
explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against 
a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, 
not the more generalized notion of "substantive due 
process," must be the guide for analyzing these claims.' " 
Albright, 510 U.S. at 273, 114 S.Ct. at 813 (quoting Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 
(1989). Although the Court did not address the merits of a 
Fourth Amendment argument because Albright had not 
raised such an argument in his petition for certiorari, it left 
open the possibility that Albright could have succeeded if 
he had relied on the Fourth Amendment. See Albright, 510 
U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. at 813-14. As several courts have 
noted, the Supreme Court's failure to rule on the merits of 
a Fourth Amendment claim, as well as the splintered views 
on the constitutional implications of malicious prosecution 
claims expressed in the various concurrences, has created 
great uncertainty in the law. See Taylor v. Meacham, 82 
F.3d 1556, 1561 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that "Albright 
muddied the waters rather than clarified them"); Reed v. 
City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(referring to the "Albright minefield"). 
 
By stating that "the accused is not entitled to judicial 
oversight or review of the decision to prosecute," Albright 
implies that prosecution without probable cause is not, in 
and of itself, a constitutional tort. 510 U.S. at 274, 114 
S.Ct. at 813 (internal quotations omitted).5 Instead, the 
constitutional violation is the deprivation of liberty 
accompanying the prosecution. Thus, as the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in a post-Albright 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with this point in his dissent. See 
Albright, 510 U.S. at 291,114 S. Ct. at 822. He wrote that initiating a 
prosecution without the equivalent of probable cause invoked enough 
liberty concerns to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 294-96, 114 S. Ct. at 823-24. 
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decision, a plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution claim 
must show "some deprivation of liberty consistent with the 
concept of `seizure.' " Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 
F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995). The district court was 
therefore correct in focusing on the seizure issue in 
evaluating Gallo's claim.6 
 
2. Was Gallo seized? 
 
Because under the common law, the tort of malicious 
prosecution concerns "perversion of proper legal 
procedures," Gallo must show that he suffered a seizure as 
a consequence of a legal proceeding. See Singer, 63 F.3d at 
116-17. In this case, the legal proceeding was the 
indictment, and Gallo's post-indictment liberty was 
restricted in the following ways: he had to post a $10,000 
bond, he had to attend all court hearings including his trial 
and arraignment, he was required to contact Pretrial 
Services on a weekly basis, and he was prohibited from 
traveling outside New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Although it 
is a close question, we agree with Gallo that these 
restrictions amounted to a seizure. 
 
Relying on the common law understanding of the 
purpose of bail, Justice Ginsburg explained in her 
concurrence in Albright that "the difference between pretrial 
incarceration and other ways to secure a defendant's court 
attendance [is] a distinction between methods of retaining 
control over a defendant's person, not one between seizure 
and its opposite." 510 U.S. at 278, 114 S. Ct. at 815. Thus, 
although recognizing that a defendant who is incarcerated 
pending trial suffers greater deprivation than one released 
on bail, Justice Ginsburg concluded that even the latter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In fact, by suggesting that malicious prosecution in and of itself is 
not 
a harm, Albright also suggests that a plaintiff would not need to prove 
all 
of the common law elements of the tort in order to recover in federal 
court. For instance, if the harm alleged is a seizure lacking probable 
cause, it is unclear why a plaintiff would have to show that the police 
acted with malice. Justice Ginsburg hints at this point in her 
concurrence in Albright, when she writes that the constitutional tort 
authorized by section 1983 "stands on its own, influenced by the 
substance, but not tied to the formal categories and procedures, of the 
common law." Albright, 510 U.S. at 277 n.1, 114 S. Ct. at 815 n.1. 
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defendant is seized. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 279, 114 S.Ct. 
at 815-16. She wrote: "Such a defendant is scarcely at 
liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his 
movements, indeed `seized' for trial, so long as he is bound 
to appear in court and answer the state's charges." Albright, 
510 U.S. at 279, 114 S.Ct. at 816. We find this analysis 
compelling and supported by Supreme Court case law.7 
 
Supreme Court decisions provide that a seizure is a show 
of authority that restrains the liberty of a citizen, see, e.g. 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-27, 111 S.Ct. 
1547, 1550-51 (1991), or a "government termination of 
freedom of movement intentionally applied." County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1715 (1998). The 
case law also shows that an actual physical touching is not 
required to effect a seizure. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 
111 S.Ct. at 1551. 
 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has clarified that 
seizures can be of different intensities. Thus, whereas an 
arrest that results in detention may be the most common 
type of seizure, an investigative stop that detains a citizen 
only momentarily also is a seizure. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 16-18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877-78 (1968). Terry 
demonstrates that the legal distinction between an arrest 
and an investigative stop is not that one is a seizure and 
the other is not, but that the police may be able to execute 
a stop based on circumstances not rising to the level of 
probable cause for an arrest. See 392 U.S. at 20 n.16, 88 
S.Ct. at 1879 n.16. This analysis suggests that the 
restrictions imposed upon Gallo would qualify as a seizure, 
even though they did not amount to a full blown arrest. 
 
When he was obliged to go to court and answer the 
charges against him, Gallo, like the plaintiff in Terry, was 
brought to a stop. This process may not have the feel of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. At least two other members of the Court appeared to agree with 
Justice Ginsburg's understanding of the concept of seizure. See Albright, 
510 U.S. at 290, 308, 114 S. Ct. at 822, 830 (Souter J., concurring) 
(suggesting his agreement by indicating that movement is restrained 
when "seizure occurs or bond terms are imposed"); (Stevens, J. 
dissenting) (explicitly agreeing with Justice Ginsburg's analysis on this 
point). 
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seizure because it is effected by authority of the court, not 
by the immediate threat of physical force. Force, however, 
lies behind the court's commands as it lies behind the 
policeman's "Stop." Gallo's physical motion was subjected 
to authority that had the effect of making him halt. In the 
present state of our law, it is difficult to distinguish this 
kind of halt from the exercise of authority deemed to be a 
seizure in Terry. 
 
The Supreme Court's ruling that release on personal 
recognizance satisfies the "in custody" provision of the 
federal habeas corpus statute also suggests that the 
restrictions imposed upon Gallo should qualify as a seizure. 
See Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 
294, 300-01, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 1809-10 (1984). Although the 
Supreme Court has not held that the definition of"in 
custody" parallels the definition of seizure, the Court's 
construction of the term is relevant given that both seizure 
and custody concern governmental restriction of the 
freedom of those suspected of crime. In ruling that release 
on personal recognizance qualifies as "custody," the Court 
recognized that bail restrictions on travel, as well as 
mandatory attendance at court hearings does restrain 
liberty, particularly because failure to obey, or failure to 
appear, constitutes a criminal offense under state law. See 
Lydon, 466 U.S. at 301, 104 S.Ct. at 1809. 
 
Our precedent, as represented by Lee v. Mihalich, also 
suggests that we should find that Gallo was seized. 
Although, as we explained above, Albright places into doubt 
Lee's conclusion that alleging the common law elements of 
malicious prosecution is enough to show a constitutional 
violation under section 1983, Lee itself represents a broad 
approach regarding bringing malicious prosecution claims 
in federal court. Given that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Albright does not determine conclusively what kinds of 
Fourth Amendment violations would be actionable under 
section 1983, we would remain closest to our own 
precedent by adopting a broad approach in considering 
what constitutes a seizure. 
 
Further, we note that the only other court of appeals, of 
which we are aware, to examine the issue raised in this 
appeal has ruled that pretrial restrictions on travel and 
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required attendance at court hearings constitute a seizure. 
See Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 945 (2d Cir. 1997). In 
its reasoning, Murphy relied on Justice Ginsburg's 
concurrence in Albright, as well as the conclusion that 
restriction of the right to travel should have Fourth 
Amendment implications. See id. at 944-47; see also Britton 
v. Maloney, 981 F. Supp. 25, 37-38 (D.Mass. 1997) 
(adopting Justice Ginsburg's theory and finding required 
attendance at court hearings enough to constitute a 
seizure). Although some courts of appeals have expressed 
doubts about theories of seizure like Justice Ginsburg's, 
none appear to have rejected such a theory in the context 
of a malicious prosecution claim. See Riley v. Dorton, 115 
F.3d 1159, 1162 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Justice 
Ginsburg's theory in context of claim alleging excessive 
force post-arrest); Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d at 1053- 
54 (rejecting malicious prosecution claim because plaintiff 
had failed to show any improper influence or knowing 
misstatements by the police); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 
581, 584 (11th Cir. 1996) (expressing doubt about Justice 
Ginsburg's theory but declining to reach a final decision on 
its merits); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir. 
1989) (rejecting idea of continuous seizure in claim of 
excessive force applied post-arrest). 
 
The appellees argue, however, and the district court 
agreed, that the restrictions imposed upon Gallo are simply 
not significant enough to constitute a seizure. In stating 
this argument, the appellees make two specific claims. 
First, they contend that Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 
S.Ct. 854 (1975), forecloses Gallo's claim. Second, they 
argue that an individual free to move about in his own state 
cannot be "seized." We address each argument in turn. 
 
In Gerstein, the Supreme Court concluded that when an 
individual is prosecuted based on an information, a judicial 
determination of probable cause is a "prerequisite to [an] 
extended restraint of liberty following arrest." 420 U.S. at 
114, 95 S.Ct. at 863. Additionally, the Court clarified that 
the probable cause requirement applies only to "significant" 
restraints on liberty and specifically stated that merely 
appearing at trial does not qualify as "significant." Gerstein, 
420 U.S. at 124-25 & n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 868-69 & n.26. The 
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appellees claim that the restrictions imposed on Gallo 
similarly do not qualify as significant, and thus cannot 
amount to a seizure. 
 
In our view, however, Gerstein's holding does not apply in 
this case. Gerstein did not address specifically the definition 
of a seizure, and Supreme Court cases have not equated a 
seizure with a significant deprivation of liberty. Second, not 
all seizures require probable cause; for instance, in Terry 
the Supreme Court suggested that an investigative stop 
could be executed based on circumstances not constituting 
probable cause. Thus, while Gerstein may hold that only 
those seizures that amount to a significant liberty 
deprivation must be proceeded by a probable cause 
determination, it does not hold that only those liberty 
restrictions that require probable cause are seizures. 
 
Next, we acknowledge, as suggested by the district court, 
that it may seem anomalous to consider an individual who 
is free to move about in his own home state as "seized." 
Indeed, Supreme Court cases concerning seizure generally 
involve restricting an individual's movement to a small 
area. Thus, an arrested person is confined to a cell, a 
station house, or a police car. Moreover, a person subject to 
a Terry stop does not feel free to move past the police officer 
effectuating the stop. It is therefore conceptually more 
difficult to view someone restricted to the boundaries of 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania as "seized." 
 
We do not view this difficulty, however, as fatal to Gallo's 
claims. Importantly, the constraints on Gallo's freedom 
were not limited to restrictions on his travel, he was also 
compelled to attend all court hearings. An individual 
detained briefly by the police, even if frisked in the process, 
may be viewed as suffering no greater a deprivation of 
liberty than an individual like Gallo, whose liberty was 
restrained through travel restrictions and mandatory court 
appearances over an eight and a half month period. While 
a Terry stop may be upsetting, it is fleeting, whereas Gallo's 
liberty was constrained in multiple ways for an extended 
period of time. Thus, we conclude that the limited scope of 
the seizure here is germane to damages not liability. 
 
In reaching our result we recognize that the district court 
observed that accepting Gallo's position would result in 
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constitutionalizing the tort of malicious prosecution. The 
court is correct that if the facts of this case amount to a 
seizure, then nearly all individuals alleging malicious 
prosecution will be able to sue under section 1983 because 
travel restrictions and required attendance at court 
hearings inhere in many prosecutions. Further, the concern 
of constitutionalizing a common law tort is legitimate given 
the Supreme Court's repeated reminder that section 1983 
permits recovery only for rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, not the common law. See Memphis Community 
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06, 106 S.Ct. 
2537, 2542 (1996). 
 
But the fact that many plaintiffs alleging malicious 
prosecution now may be able to bring suit under section 
1983 does not, in and of itself, justify rejecting Gallo's 
seizure claims. First, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that "[i]n some cases, the interests protected by the 
common law of torts may parallel closely the interests 
protected by a particular constitutional right." Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1049 (1978). 
Second, in a sense, a claim of malicious prosecution 
against public officials always has had constitutional 
ramifications. After all, a malicious prosecution is not an 
ordinary tort. Instead, a claim of malicious prosecution 
brought under section 1983 or Bivens alleges the abuse of 
the judicial process by government agents. Such a claim 
directly implicates at least one of the interests protected by 
the Fourth Amendment: preventing misconduct in the 
criminal context. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. at 
1875. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that the combination of restrictions imposed 
upon Gallo, because they intentionally limited his liberty, 
constituted a seizure. We therefore will reverse the district 
court's order of August 15, 1997, granting the motion to 
dismiss and the motion for partial summary judgment and 
will remand the matter to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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